Battle - 1721 - 22nd March - Raid at Port-de-Paix

Ships in Action:
ALLIES:

 Captain Robert Middlemore - HMS Fearless (Mercy-class Fifth-rate)

Twenty-three other British ships, comprising mostly Fifth-rates (Archelon-class, Mercy-class and Hercules-class) and a couple of Reason-class Fourth-rates.

ENEMIES:

French fleet of twenty-four vessels comprising nearly half ships of the line (at least four First-rates, three Second-rates, and three Third-rates) and the rest Fourth-rates and heavy Fifth-rates.

Action Setup:
The British fleet sailed on Port-de-Paix some distance leeward of the French defensive picket to the north. Groups were organised and a line formed in good order, with myself (Captain Middlemore) assigned to Black Group under the command of Commodore Edward Carlisle along with two other Mercy-class frigates and three Hercules-class vessels, assuming the mid-rear of the line. Discussion amongst the captains before the battle had indicated that the French fleet at Port-de-Paix might consist of vessels of similar guns, but word from the spotters quickly put paid to that notion as several 100-gun French ships were confirmed.

The Action Itself:
Once the French admiral understood how severely his forces outgunned us, their fleet sallied out from the protection of their cove, possessing the wind gage whilst our own line found itself close-hauled on the starboard tack.

Our own Admiral Tikkas was quick to rectify the situation with the fleet's superior maneouvrability, and as the French force split into a double-line formation to close to engage, the British fleet boxhauled to seize the wind and bring their broadsides to bear against the oncoming French. The lead French ship, a First-rate, was taken by surprise and suffered heavy fire, being holed beneath the waterline and quickly taking on water.

With the advantage of the wind, the British fleet now began to circle the French line and exchange broadsides, Black Group being towards the fore of the line following the boxhaul. Although my view was unclear from this position, it was evident that the rear line began to take a mauling from the French ships-of-the-line and took casualties. Regardless we pressed our turn about the French flank, dismasting and holing one of their Third-rates.

British casualties mounted, with the Admiral and several of his Commodores wounded or their ships dismasted. Although the British line continued on its course around the French, exchanging constant broadsides, orders became scarce and it was left almost entirely for each captain to choose his own target, leading to ineffectual fire.

By the time our flanking manouevre was complete, only ships from Black and Green Groups seemed to still be intact, for the most part, spare a couple of losses in each and a couple of survivors from other commands. However, Commodore Carlisle and myself were able to identify a pair of French fifth-rates which had become isolated at the enemy line's rear to our starboard, and did all in our power to signal the remaining British vessels to concentrate their fire. One of the pair, a Hercules-class of mastercraft quality, was thus despatched by our gun crews.

At this point, finding ourselves at broad reach on the port tack, the Commodore signalled our retreat and the remaining vessels, including the Fearless, were able to escape without further losses.

The Result:
Approximately half the British fleet was sunk, captured, or severely damaged. However, numbers alone do not tell the full story, and the loss of a French First-rate, Third-rate, and Hercules-class Mastercraft do, I believe, adequately account for British casualties by damage to the overall strength of the French fleet and economy in these waters. I am also proud to say of my gun crews that they were able to put full and accurate broadsides into both the First-rate and Hercules, aiding in their sinking. As reward I have ordered double rum ration for the day.

Lessons Learned:
Although we were outgunned from the start, and the chances of any success were slim, superior manouevring did deliver us the advantage of the wind, surprise, and the crippling loss of a First-rate to the French. Even after the British fleet began to suffer casualties,it is my feeling that there remained more than enough weight of fire to sink further French ships - however, the loss of our key leaders caused a situation of confusion with regards to targets. Thus, our initially well-focused broadsides became dispersed and ineffectual for most of the remaining battle until Commodore Carlisle and myself took the initiative to signal the remaining vessels to fire upon the Hercules.

I can only rue that both myself and the other captains did not take this initiative sooner; I can only speak for myself in stating that reluctance to do so arises from a lack of experience and seniority, not feeling it my place to give such signals. However, in future we must all - myself included - be ready and able to take such responsibility and initiative as is appropriate and necessary when the chain-of-command becomes severed by enemy action.